U.S. banks have found a new way to unload risk as they scramble to adapt to tighter regulations and rising interest rates, using so-called synthetic risk transfers

As U.S. banks grapple with the challenges posed by tighter regulations and rising interest rates, they have turned to a new strategy to offload risk. Major financial institutions, including JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and U.S. Bank, are selling complex debt instruments known as "synthetic risk transfers" to private-fund managers. These transactions are designed to reduce regulatory capital charges associated with the loans these banks provide.

While these synthetic risk transfers come at a cost to the banks, they are more affordable than absorbing the full capital charges on the underlying assets. Investors who participate in these transactions can earn returns of approximately 15% or more. This approach has gained traction in the autumn of this year, allowing banks to lighten their growing regulatory burden.

Regulators have consistently raised capital requirements in recent years, with even more stringent measures proposed following the onset of the banking crisis in March. Higher interest rates have also eroded the value of banks' investment portfolios, impacting regulatory capital levels.

In these risk transfers, investors purchase credit-linked notes or credit derivatives issued by the banks, amounting to around 10% of the loan portfolios being de-risked. These investors receive interest payments and, in return, assume losses if a certain percentage of borrowers within the pooled loans default.

JPMorgan has been actively engaging in deals worth $2.5 billion to reduce capital charges on approximately $25 billion of its corporate and consumer loans. These transactions work somewhat like insurance policies, with banks paying interest rather than premiums. By lowering their potential loss exposure, these transfers enable banks to reduce the amount of capital they must hold against their loans.

It is estimated that banks globally will transfer risk related to about $200 billion in loans this year, up from approximately $160 billion in 2022. Private-credit fund managers, such as Ares Management and Magnetar Capital, have become active buyers of these transactions. Firms like Blackstone's hedge-fund unit and D.E. Shaw have also entered the risk-transfer market.

This development reflects a significant shift on Wall Street, where hedge funds, private-equity firms, and other alternative investment firms that purchase private credit are playing an increasingly vital role in the financial landscape. These private-credit investment managers have become formidable competitors, taking over core businesses like corporate lending and acquiring banks' portfolios of mortgages and consumer loans.

Although synthetic risk transfers were used by banks approximately two decades ago, their utilization waned in the U.S. following the 2008-09 financial crisis. The complexity of credit transactions and concerns about contagion risks contributed to their diminished use.

In contrast, European and Canadian regulators established clear guidelines and higher capital charges for such transactions, leading banks in those regions to embrace synthetic risk transfers. U.S. regulations have been more cautious, with the Federal Reserve rejecting requests from U.S. banks to employ these instruments in line with European practices.

The situation began to change this year when the Federal Reserve indicated a more flexible approach. While the Fed committed to reviewing requests for capital relief on a case-by-case basis, it did not adopt the European approach.

This shift is easing the tension between the banks and regulators. In recent years, tensions had risen as new rules, including capital requirements linked to annual stress tests, came into effect. Furthermore, higher interest rates in 2022 and 2023 lowered the value of banks' bond holdings, further weighing on regulatory capital levels.

Additional capital rules are forthcoming, with U.S. bank regulators proposing to implement Basel III requirements that could increase capital charges by roughly 20% and penalize businesses generating substantial fees, including banks' wealth-management and trading divisions. This "Basel Endgame" represents a more stringent framework than some banks had anticipated, prompting them to halt stock buybacks.